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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION-
PERMISSIVE BOUNDS OF PRIOR
RESTRAINT OF MOVIES
Teitel Film Corporation, in accordance with the Chicago Motion Picture
Ordinance, submitted two films for screening by Police Film Review Section,
"Body of a Female" and "Rent-A-Girl." The films were refused licensing on
the grounds of obscenity, whereupon Teitel Corporation requested the Motion
Picture Appeal Board to review the rejection. After viewing the films and
conducting hearings, the Board decided to uphold the Section's determina-
tion and, following the procedural steps of the ordinance, filed a complaint in
the Circuit Court of Cook County seeking a permanent injunction against
the public exhibition of the films. The trial court in similar memorandum
opinions held the ordinance to be constitutional, found the films to be obscene,
and granted the injunction. Thereupon, Teitel Corporation appealed to the
Illinois Supreme Court which upheld the lower court's determination that
the censorship act was constitutionally valid and that the films were not pro-
tected expression.' On appeal, the United States Supreme Court, in a per
curiam decision, reversed the Illinois court's findings, holding the ordinance
to be unconstitutional on its face and as applied. The Supreme Court based
the reversal on the precedent set in Freedman v. Maryland2 and decided that
the statutory period for administrative censorship and the absence of a pro-
vision for a prompt judicial decision violated the procedural yardsticks of
Freedman and the distributor's first and fourteenth amendment guarantees.
Teitel Film Corporation v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139 (1968).
Teitel leaves censorship law unchanged and merely reiterates and reaf-
firms the Supreme Court's holding in Freedman. The skeletal guidelines of
movie review procedure promulgated by the Freedman opinion remain a con-
stitutional model for censorship legislation.
In the instant case, Teitel Corporation asserted two constitutional proposi-
tions: the administrative and judicial time periods provided by the Chicago
ordinance fell beyond any permissible constitutional prior restraint limita-
tions; the same statutory time guidelines bore no resemblance to the pro-
cedural safeguards set down in the Freedman case.3 The Court in its brief
decision accepted the validity of petitioner's second contention but did not
discuss or analyze the constitutional precedents for the evolution of the Freed-
man case. Likewise, the Court, by passing over petitioner's first contention,
1 Cusack v. Teitel Film Corporation, 38 IIU. 2d 53, 230 N.E.2d 241 (1967), rev'd, 390
U.S. 139 (1968).
2 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
8 Brief for Defendant at 3, 9, 10, Cusack v. Teitel Film Corp., supra note 1.
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failed to raise the implications and explications of the doctrine of prior re-
straint. Of first concern to this case note are these two glossed-over areas:
prior restraint as a constitutional doctrine, and the history of movie censor-
ship legislation and judicial review. Of second concern to this note is the
feasibility and the desirability of legislative incorporation of the Freedman-
Teitel Film guidelines into practical censorship legislation.
A principle constitutional doctrine limiting restriction of first amendment
freedom of expression, inherently embodies the conflict between the notions
of prior restraint and subsequent punishment. Whereas subsequent punish-
ment is the subjection of individuals or publications to legal prosecution
after the act, prior restraint is the legal suppression of material or its expres-
sion before publication. 4 This constitutional theory, known as the doctrine of
prior restraint, forbids the state or federal government from imposing any
pre-publication proscription, with certain few exceptions, on any activity en-
compassed by the first amendment liberties.5 In operation, prior restraint acts
as a procedural device to restrict the freedom to disseminate ideas.
Historically, prior restraint took the form of licensing and censorship acts.
Many forms of such legislation were employed by the British in the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries in their attempts to protect the public
security by proscribing certain modes and types of publication. Gradually,
the British system of censorship and criminal libel depredated the liberties
of Englishmen by the arbitrary suppression of all discussion and dissent
unfavorable to the government.6 Consequently, in American constitutional
history, the first amendment was designed to prevent the establishment of
any similar pre-publication restraint.7 Freedom of expression became the
rule; previous restraint became the exception.
The doctrine of prior restraint was first invoked as a constitutional tenet
in Near v. Minnesota.8 A Minnesota statute provided for injunctive and
contempt relief against anyone publishing obscene or defamatory material.
The Court held the statute in operation and effect to be a form of censorship
and an unconstitutional restriction on first amendment freedoms, commenting:
"[1]iberty of speech, and of the press, is ... not an absolute right" 9 and "the
4 Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 648 (1955).
See also Justice Harlan's dissent in A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S.
205, 224-25 (1964) for an analysis of a censorship procedure.
5 For an in depth discussion of previous restraint and first amendment theories, see
Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 9-31 (1954).
6 L. W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPRESsioN 6-10 (1960).
7 C. H. PRTCHETT, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 398 (1959). For a judicial survey of
the history and intent behind the first amendment and prior restraint, see Chief Justice
Hughes' opinion in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
8283 U.S. 697 (1931).
9 Id. at 708.
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protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited."' 0 As
instances of where a prior restraint would be constitutionally allowable, the
Court noted four situations; "when a nation is at war," where the "primary.
requirements of decency" demand protection, when "acts of violence and the
overthrow by force of orderly government" threaten community security,
and where private rights require preservation."
In the ensuing years, the Supreme Court's involvement with prior restraint
legislation encompassed many areas and embraced many constitutional
liberties.12 One such area was movie censorship; one such liberty was the
freedom of expression.
The Court has viewed the motion picture as a peculiar means of dissemina-
ting information and opinion distinct from other communicative modes. In
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson the Court pointed out that it is a non sequitur
that "motion pictures are necessarily subject to the precise rules governing
any other particular method of expression. Each method tends to present its
own peculiar problems."13 And more to the point, the Court in Freedman v.
Maryland, observed that "The requirement of prior submission to a censor
. . . is consistent with our recognition that films differ from other forms of
expression."'1 4 Because of this judicial angle of vision, the regulations placed
on movie exhibitions are likewise peculiar. While books, newspapers, and
other publications have escaped the tentacles of censorship legislation, movies
fall within its restrictive grasp. In each instance of censorship regulation,
the Court has attempted to mediate the inherent conflict between the censor's
guardianship of the community morals and the individual's freedom to
exhibit his expressions.
The beginnings of municipal censorship ordinances date back to the City
of Chicago Ordinance of 1907,11 which provided for a censorship board and
'Old. at 716.
11 Id.
12 The Court has struck down state and municipal legislation aimed at restricting: the
freedom of the press, Grosjean v. Am. Press, 297 U.S. 233 (1936) ; the freedom to dis-
seminate literature, Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) and Schneider v. State,
308 U.S. 147 (1939) ; the freedom to solicit for a religious sect, Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940) ; the freedom of assembly, Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organi-
zation, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); the freedom of speech, Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558
(1948) ; the freedom to picket, Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); and the free-
dom to solicit for union organization, Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945). At the
other end of the constitutional spectrum, the Court has upheld city and state licensing
regulations impeding: the freedom of publications, Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range
Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911); the freedom to assemble, Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S.
395 (1953) ; the freedom to hold a parade, Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941);
and the freedom to speak, Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
13 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952).
14 Supra note 2, at 60, 61.
15 CHICAGO, ILLINOIS CITY CHARTER, art. 5, cI. 5, (1907).
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administrative proceedings to screen all films and to deny a license to those
which violated the statutory standards of immorality, obscenity, and the
portrayal of crime and violence. The thinking of the city council which
prompted it to pass such legislation was based on a Judeo-Christian concern
for the public welfare and morality. Such a prior restraint was a preventative
piece of legislation aimed at reducing the supposed evil effects 6 of immoral
and obscene movies on society. The first judicial determination of the consti-
tutionality of the ordinance bears witness to such a rationale:
The purpose of the ordinance is to secure decency and morality in the moving
picture business and that purpose falls within the police power. . . .The welfare
of society demands that every effort of municipal authorities to afford such protec-
tion shall be sustained, unless it is clear that some constitutional right is interfered
with.17
The Illinois court concluded that such legislation did not violate constitutional
guarantees; but, contrarily, its existence afforded citizens and society protec-
tion by restraining and impeding abuse of constitutional liberties.
The United States Supreme Court first entered the field of judicial deter-
mination of the constitutionality of movie censorship in 1915 in Mutual Film
Corporation v. Industrial Commission of Ohio,'5 setting the precedent for the
next thirty-seven years of film censorship laws. Holding that motion pictures
are not within the constitutional protection encompassed by the first amend-
ment, the Court stated, "The exhibition of moving pictures is a business
pure and simple . .. not to be regarded . . .as part of the press of the
country. ..."19 Peripherally, the Court laid the basis of the state's right to
enact censorship legislation on the two-tiered platform of the public welfare 20
and the police power.21 The Mutual Film decision stood as settled law until
'6Infra note 81.
17 Block v. City of Chicago, 239 Ill. 251, 258, 87 N.E. 1011, 1013 (1909). The films
condemned in Block were entitled "The James Boys" and "Night Raiders," neither of
which the court spoke highly of: "Pictures which attempt to exhibit that career neces-
sarily portray exhibitions of crime, and pictures of the 'Night Raiders' can represent
nothing but malicious mischief, arson and murder. These are both immoral and their
exhibition would necessarily be attended with evil effects upon youthful spectators."
Id. at 265, 87 N.E. at 1016. Such early twentieth century legislative and judicial concern
centered around the twin evils of violence and pornography. Modern enforcement of
censorship legislation attacks only the one standard of obscenity. See IRA H. CARMEN,
MOVES, CENSORSHIP, AND THE LAw 181 (1966). Such current exclusive concern prompted
one anonymous poet to exclaim: "This film is under official ban because the hero has
uttered damn well, we will go to see another, and watch a gangster shoot his mother."
R. W. HANEY, COMSTOCKERY IN AMERICA 117 (1960).
18236 U.S. 230 (1915).
19 Id. at 244.
20 Id. at 242.
21 Id. at 244.
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1948 when in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. the Court, by way of
dictum, indicated that motion pictures did fall within the scope of first
amendment guarantees. 22 Four years later Burstyn23 expressly adopted that
very proposition.
"Whether motion pictures are within the ambit of protection which the
First Amendment, through the Fourteenth, secures to any form of 'speech'
or 'the press' " was the issue in contention in Burstyn.24 Reversing Mutual
Film, the Court declared that movies are "a form of expression whose liberty
is safeguarded by the First Amendment. ' 25 The conclusion that motion pic-
tures are constitutionally protected necessarily raised the issue of prior re-
straint; and, while the Court held that freedom of expression is the general
rule, it did not "follow that the Constitution requires absolute freedom to
exhibit every motion picture of every kind at all times and all places."
26
Opening the door to the necessity for future decisions, the Court concluded
that "it is not necessary for us to decide, for example, whether a state may
censor motion pictures under a clearly drawn statute designed and applied
to prevent the showing of obscene films."'2
7
Nine years later the Court, in Time Film Corporation v. City of Chicago,
faced the issue of whether the first and fourteenth constitutional guarantees
"includes complete and absolute freedom to exhibit, at least once, any and
every kind of motion picture?"' 28 Justice Clark, in the opinion, cited Near v.
Minnesota29 and Burstyn v. Wilson30 for the constitutional doctrine that
first amendment freedoms are not absolute nor are prior restraints absolutely
prohibited, and then summarily concluded that prior restraint movie censor-
ship procedure is not per se unconstitutional.51 The four dissenting justices3 2
took issue with the majority on the basis that the case presented approval
of "unlimited censorship of motion pictures before exhibition through a
system of administrative licensing."33 They further felt that total lack of
22 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948). "We have no doubt that motion pictures, like newspapers
and radio, are included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed by the First Amendment."
23 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
24 Id. at 501.
2 5 Id. at 501, 502.
26 Id. at 502.
27 Id. at 505, 506.
28 365 U.S. 43, 46 (1961).
29 Supra note 8.
3 OSupra note 23.
31Supra note 28.
32 Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan.
3 3 Supra note 28, at 50.
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judicial proceedings was violative of the first amendment guarantees because
"The delays in adjudication may well result in irreparable damage [to free
communication], both to the litigant and to the public. '3 4 The Times Film
case conclusively settled the haggled constitutional question of the valid-
ity of movie censorship per se, but the Court offered no standards or any
criteria as to what type of censorship legislation sufficiently safeguarded
constitutional rights.
In the absence of applicable norms, state legislatures formulated a
variety of procedural hodgepodges to restrain the distribution of obscene
material in the name of censorship and constitutional prior restraint.
Missouri adopted a statute which allowed a police officer to obtain, at
his discretion, a warrant to search for and seize publications, which provided
for the warrant to be issued in an ex parte proceeding without any hearing
on or viewing of the alleged obscene material by the judge, and which re-
quired a hearing to be held within twenty days after seizure to determine
obscenity. A petitioner's contention that such legislation was violative of his
constitutional guarantees because of the lack of notice and of a pre-restraint
hearing was supported in Marcus v. Search Warrant3 5 by the Court which
held that procedure breached the first amendment protection afforded to non-
objectionable material. As to what type of procedural safeguards the con-
stitutional guarantees require, the Court was not explicit; but it did make
reference to Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown3 6 and the statutory provisions
therein.
The New York statute involved in Kingsley allowed certain public officials
to maintain an action for an injunction to prevent the sale or distribution of
any publication of an indecent character. Thereafter, the individual or
corporation enjoined was entitled to a trial of the issues within one day after
joinder and to a decision by the court within two days after the trial con-
cluded. The Supreme Court found the procedure provided adequate notice to
the distributor, a fair determination of the issue, and a prompt judicial
hearing, all of which guaranteed the constitutional protection non-objection-
able material demands. The Court noted an analogy between a penal obscenity
statute and the injunctive statute; in each case, the law moves after publica-
tion, and, in each situation, the distributor has notice that the further sale
of the alleged objectionable material would subject him to penal conse-
quences.3 7
Rhode Island created a commission "to educate the public concerning any
book . . . or other thing containing obscene, indecent, or impure language,
34 Id. at 73.
35367 U.S. 717 (1961).
86354 U.S. 436 (1957).
37 Id. at 442-43.
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or manifestly tending to the corruption of youth . . . and to investigate and
recommend the prosecution of all violations of said sections." 8 In practice,
the Commission would notify a distributor that certain books or magazines
distributed by him were reviewed and declared objectionable under the
statute and requested him to cooperate or face prosecution. In Bantam Books,
Inc. v. Sullivan, a case testing the procedure's constitutionality, the Court
began by stating that "any system of prior restraints of expression comes to
this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity,"
89
and noted that the procedure provided no assurance that protection would be
afforded to non-obscene matter. The Court concluded that although the
statute attempted to restrict harmful publications from the minds of
youths, the cooperation the commission requested invariably caused complete
suppression of the material among adults also, restricting their literary diet
to what was fit for children.
During this same period of Supreme Court activity with censorship legis-
lation, state courts also responded to similar issues. In City of Portland
v. Welch, 40 the Oregon Supreme Court held that the Oregon constitution
prohibits any type of prior restraint on free speech or press; 41 likewise, the
Supreme Court of Georgia, in K. Gordon Murray Productions, Inc. v. Floyd,42
held a prior restraint act violative of the freedom of expression provision in
the state constitution. 48
After the Times Film Corporation v. City of Chicago decision in 1961, 44
the Chicago Movie Censorship Act was immediately challenged on the ground
that its procedural structure violated constitutional guarantees. In Zenith
International Film Corporation v. City of Chicago,45 the district court passed
38 Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 59-60 (1963).
8 9 Supra note 38, at 70.
40 229 Ore. 308, 367 P.2d 403 (1961).
41 ORE. CONST. art. I, § 8: "No law shall be passed restraining the free expression of
opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever;
but every person shall be responsible for the abuse of this right."
42 217 Ga. 784, 125 S.E.2d 207 (1962).
48 GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, par. 15: "No law shall ever be passed to curtail, or restrain
the liberty of speech, or of the press; any person may speak, write, and publish his
sentiments, on all subjects ... .
Teitel Corporation contended that Art. II, § 4 of the Illinois Constitution prohibited
any prior restraint of expression: "Every person may freely speak, write, and publish
on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty . . ." Teitel Corporation
asserted, ". . . if the language of the Illinois Constitution is to mean anything what-
soever, it cannot be construed to allow a prior restraint such as is imposed by the
challenged Chicago Ordinance." Brief for Appellants at 21, Cusack v. Teitel Film Cor-
poration, supra note 1. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected that argument and held
that prior restraint does not violate any constitutional guarantees of the Illinois Con-
stitution.
4 4 Supra note 28.
45 291 F.2d 785 (1961).
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directly on the issue of municipal administration of prior restraint. The
guidelines of the licensing act in question provided for a review of all films
by the police department and for appeals to be taken to the mayor. The court
in its decision systematically listed the following as impairments of the
exhibitor's constitutional rights: lack of a full and fair hearing on the
standing of the film allowing no opportunity for the exhibitor to be heard or
to present evidence of contemporary community standards, the screening
of the film as a whole by only one review board in the entire administrative
procedure, the lack of standards for the film review board, the absence of a
de novo hearing before the mayor, the lack of structural appellate process to
the mayor, and a failure to indicate on what grounds the films were re-
jected. 4, In response to these judicial objections, the City Council of Chicago
revised the censorship ordinance. The amended ordinance provided for a
Film Review Section under the supervision of the superintendent of police, a
Motion Picture Appeal Board composed of experts in the social and literary
fields, and time guidelines within which the administrative process must
proceed.4
7
Three years later, the Supreme Court handed down the Freedman v. Mary-
land decision,48 the precedent cited as controlling in the instant case. Peti-
tioner challenged the constitutionality of the Maryland Motion Picture
Censorship Statute by arguing that such a licensing procedure presented
"a danger of unduly supressing protected expression" by the allowance of
little or late judicial review.49 After discussing the statute's format and
applying it to the case at hand, the Court decided that "risk of delay is
built into the Maryland procedure,"50 and concluded:
Applying the settled rule of our cases, we hold a non-criminal process which re-
quires the prior submission of a film to a censor avoids constitutional infirmity
only if it takes place under procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers
of a censorship system. 51
Subsequently delineating such censorship safeguards, the Court laid down the
procedural requirements: the burden of proving that the film is unprotected
expression must rest with the censoring board; the censor's determination
46 1d. at 790.
47 CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 155-2, 155-7.1, 155-7.2 (1961).
48380 U.S. 51 (1965).
49 Id. at 54.
Old. at 55. The Court went on, "... as is borne out by experience; in the only
reported case indicating the length of time required to complete an appeal, the initial
judicial determination has taken four months, and final vindication of the film on
appellate review, six months."
5 1 Id. at 58.
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must not be considered a final decision; only a judicial determination can
validly impose a final prior restraint; the exhibitor must be assured that
within a definite brief period of time the censor will either issue a license
or go to court to attempt to restrain the showing of the film; a prompt
judicial decision must be guaranteed; and any restraint prior to judicial
hearing must be brief and limited to preservation of the status quo.5 2 The
Court then proceeded to apply these criteria to the Maryland statute and
found it wanting as a valid constitutional prior restraint and added, "We do
not mean to lay down rigid time limits or procedures, but to suggest con-
siderations in drafting legislation . . . 53 and further, "how or whether Mary-
land is to incorporate the required procedural safeguards in the statutory
scheme is, of course, for the state to decide. But a model is not lacking:
Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown."54 Noting the New York injunctive proce-
dure,55 the Court highlighted its requirement of a judicial decision prior
to any restraint and a brief period of time allowed from a hearing to a judi-
cial decision.
In the ensuing years, the Freedman decision stood without employment
by the Supreme Court. However, state and lower federal courts applied the
applicable procedural standards to various censorship acts.
The Maryland Supreme Court reviewed the Maryland statute after revision
by the legislature and held the act constitutional when construed in the light
of the Freedman holding.56 The new enactment provides for a Review Board
decision within five days after submission of the film. If the film is not ap-
proved, the Board must send notice to the exhibitor and apply for a judicial
determination within three days. The circuit court is then required to hold
a hearing and view the film not later than five days after the complaint is
filed, and to hand down a decision within two days after the hearing. Should
the court uphold the censor's decision, the exhibitor may resort to the Court
of Appeals, such appeal being advanced to the earliest practical date on the
court docket.57 The total administrative process consumes only eight days,
and the maximum time allowed for a final judicial declaration is only
fifteen days after submission of the film for review. Further, by giving
priority on the court dockets to such cases the appellate process is accelerated.
The district court in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas58 held a
52d. at 58-59.
53 Id. at 61.
54 Id. at 60.
55 See text between footnotes 36 and 38.
56Trans-Lux Distributing Corp. v. Md. State Bd. of Censors, 240 Md. 98, 213 A2d
235 (1965).
57 MD. ANN. CODE art. 66A, § 1-26 (1965).
58 247 F. Supp. 906 (N.D. Tex. 1965).
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Dallas censorship act unconstitutional. The ordinance provided for classifica-
tion of films as suitable or non-suitable for persons under eighteen years of
age. Its procedural format required the exhibitor to file a proposed classifica-
tion of the film with the review board. If the board, contrary to the exhibitor's
proposal, refused to license the film, the exhibitor within two days after such
order could file a notice of non-acceptance. Thereafter, it became the duty
of the board to apply for prompt adjudication. If no injunction was issued
within fifteen days after the filing of the notice, the board's initial deter-
mination would be suspended. The court found the requirement of "prompt
adjudication" too vague and indefinite to ensure exhibitor's right to a speedy
determination of the issues.
Thirteen days after this decision, the City of Dallas amended the ordinance
in issue, the procedural constitutionality of which was upheld in Interstate
Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas.59 The revised ordinance retained the classifi-
cation and filing procedure but added and changed certain time restrictions.
If the censoring board fails to act within five days after receipt of the
exhibitor's classification proposal, the classification is considered approved.
If the board denies the proposal and the exhibitor files a notice of non-
acceptance, the board must seek an injunction, which must be granted within
ten days after the notice or the board's order is suspended. If the injunction
is granted and the exhibitor appeals, the board must reply within five days
and join in the petitioner's request to advance the cause on the court's
docket.60 After analyzing the ordinance, the court remarked: "It seems
obvious that this procedure complies with the standards established in
Freedman, with the only possible objection being the length of time necessary
to get a final adjudication on the merits." 61 The court resolved this last
problem by noting that, though the city cannot manipulate court dockets,
the Texas courts have made it a practice to advance such cases and that a
final judgment could be obtained from the Texas Supreme Court within
thirty-five days, that being sufficient speed to satisfy Freedman's require-
ments. 6
2
After the Supreme Court propounded the Freedman guidelines, the City
of Chicago amended its censorship ordinance to comply with the procedural
safeguards.6 3 It was this revised ordinance which Teitel Corporation tested
for constitutionality in the instant case. Teitel Corporation's assertion that
59 366 F.2d 590 (1966).
60 DALLAS, TEXAS, MUnICIPAL CODE, ch. 46A (1965).
61 Supra note 59 at 600.
62 The dissenting judge maintained that the thirty-five day period was not guaranteed
by statute or court rule, but merely by court practice; and the absence of such an
explicit guarantee made the classification statute violative of the exhibitor's constitutional
rights. Id. at 609.
63 CIr COUNCIL PROCEEDINGS OF CHIcAGo 4263 (1965).
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the time allowed for film review was unconstitutionally excessive was evi-
denced by the municipal bifurcated scheme consuming fifty-eight days at
the maximum before a final judicial proceeding could begin and by
the city's inability to control the dockets of the state courts to require
prompt judicial decisions once the judicial hearings had begun.64 In defense
of the procedural aspects of the ordinance, the city argued that Freedman
did not lay down a rigid timetable for licensing motion pictures but only
substantive due process requirements. The city emphasized that in accordance
with Freedman the local government was to structure the specific time limits
of the censorship process and went on to show good faith compliance with the
Freedman decision. The ordinance placed the burden of proof on the censor,
allowed immediate appeal of the censor's decision, ensured a reasonably
prompt final judicial hearing, and provided for review of films by experts
in the social and literary arts whose judgment assured a high degree of good
faith licensing.65
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the constitutional procedural
64 The Circuit Court of Cook County has a rule, General Order 3-3, which provides
that a hearing on an injunction pursuant to the Censorship Ordinance be held within
five days after the filing of a responsive pleading. The rule was not invoked in the
instant case because of the manner of pleadings of the parties. Brief for Teitel Film
Corporation at 7, Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139 (1968). The United States
Supreme Court pointed out in a footnote that "[clomments of the trial judge in this
case suggest doubt whether the trial court regarded compliance with this rule to be
mandatory." Supra note 3, at 140.
65 The procedural text of the ordinance at issue read:
155-1. It shall be unlawful for any person to show or exhibit in a public place, or in
a place where the public is admitted, anywhere in the City any picture or series of
pictures . . . without first having secured a permit therefore from the superintendent
of police.
It shall be unlawful for any person to lease or transfer or otherwise put into circula-
tion, any motion picture plates, films . . . to any exhibitor of motion pictures, for the
purpose of exhibition within the city, without first having secured a permit therefore
from the superintendent of police ....
155-2. Before any such permit is granted, an application in writing shall be made therefore
to the superintendent of police, and the ... films ... shall be shown to the superintendent
of police, who shall inspect such . . . films . . . or cause them to be inspected by the
Film Review Section herein provided for, and within three days after such inspection he
shall either grant or deny the permit ....
155-7. There is hereby created a Motion Picture Appeal Board .... Within seven days
after rejection by the superintendent of police, the applicant may file a written request
with the Motion Picture Appeal Board for review of the decision of the superintendent
. . . . The Board shall review the picture in its entirety within fifteen days of receipt
of said request for review. Within fifteen days after reviewing the picture and before
any determination is made by the Board, the exhibitor, his agent or distributor seeking
the permit on review shall be given an opportunity to present testimony and statements
or arguments in support of the exhibition of said film. Within five days after the
hearing, the Board shall serve written notice of its ruling upon the applicant. ...
155-7.2. In the event the Motion Picture Appeal Board affirms the decision of the
superintendent of police in rejecting a motion picture, the Board, within ten days from
the hearing, shall file with the Circuit Court of Cook County an action for an injunction
against the showing of the film .... CHICAGO, ILL. MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 155 (1965).
While the instant suit was pending in the Illinois Supreme Court, the City Council of
Chicago amended section 155-2 to read that the superintendent must inspect the films
within three days of receipt.
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aspects in light of Freedman and the first and fourteenth amendment guaran-
tees.66 After citing the Freedman guidelines and the structure of the city
ordinance, the court, without much detailed analysis, held:
After careful consideration, however, we find it unnecessary to resolve the question
of whether plaintiffs or the defendants caused all of the delay. We look rather to
the ordinance itself, in the light of Freedman and subsequent cases, and conclude
that the administration of the Chicago Motion Picture Ordinance violates no con-
stitutional rights of the defendants.67
The United States Supreme Court disagreed with these conclusions. On
appeal, the issue was "whether the Chicago Motion Picture Ordinance is
unconstitutional on its face and as applied. . . ."',8 The Court cited Freedman
and emphasized by italics the specific guidelines; one, "that the censor will
within a specified brief period, either issue a license or go to court . . ."; and,
two, the assurance of a "prompt final judicial decision" by the trial court.6 9
The Court felt the Chicago ordinance violated these standards, because the
fifty to fifty-seven days provided for administrative review did not assure a
specific brief period within which the censor will act, and because of the
absence of a provision for a prompt judicial trial and determination. Simply
interpreted, the Court reiterated its position in Freedman and declared that
these two aspects of the city ordinance surpassed the procedural limitations
of prior restraint and violated the distributor's first and fourteenth amend-
ment guarantees.
Teitel Film did not sound the death knell for movie censorship in Chicago.
Two months after the instant decision, the City Council of Chicago passed
an amended censorship ordinance.70 Responding to the Court's objections,
66 Supra note 1.
67 Id. at 63, 230 N.E.2d at 247. The elapsed administrative time for "Rent-A-Girl" was
68 days, while that for "Body of a Female" was 190 days. The elapsed total time between
receipt of the film by the censors and issuance of a final permanent injunction by the
Illinois Supreme Court was nine months and eleven months respectively.
68 Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139 (1968).
6 9 Id. at 141.
70 CITY COUNCIL PROCEEDINGS OF CMCAGO 2404 (March 20, 1968).
The revised provisions of the amended ordinance read:
155-1 . . . It shall be unlawful for any person to show or exhibit in a public place, or in
a place where the public is admitted, anywhere in the city any picture or series of pictures
... without first having secured a permit therefor from the Superintendent of Police. ...
The permit herein required shall be obtained for each and every picture or series of
pictures exhibited and is in addition to any license or other imposition required by law
or other provision of this code. . ..
All films exhibited to an audience comprised solely of persons eighteen years of age
or older may be exhibited without inspection and no permits or fees shall be required
therefor.
155-2. Before any such permit is granted, an application in writing shall be made therefor
to the Superintendent of Police and the ...picture or series of pictures . . . shall be
shown .. .to the Superintendent of Police, who shall within two days of receipt inspect
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the City Council made the Police Board's decision automatically reviewable
by the Motion Picture Appeal Board and reduced the total administrative
review period to seventeen days, allowing for the initial judicial hearing two
and one-half weeks after submission of the film to the licensing board. The
Council went beyond the Freedman-Teitel Film safeguards and fashioned
a new classification scheme. The new act requires licensing only of those
motion pictures to be exhibited before the general public. The ordinance
operates as a limited censoring system whereby only films directed at
children seventeen years of age or younger must be reviewed and judged
licenseable on the sole standard of obscenity. Only future litigation will de-
termine whether such legislation conforms to the Supreme Court's procedural
guidelines. However, a present discussion can appraise the newly enacted
procedures and analyze the feasibility and desirability of such prior restraint
legislation.
Whether the procedural changes in the new act obviate the defects of
the prior ordinance is an arguable proposition. The Supreme Court declared
the prior ordinance fatally defective on two counts, an excessively long ad-
ministrative review period, and, the absence of a guarantee for a prompt
judicial order. The new ordinance provides for a shorter administrative
procedure but does not provide any assurance of a reasonably immediate
court decision.
Whether the seventeen day review period conforms to the Supreme Court's
notion of constitutional brevity is doubtful. While constitutional guarantees
cannot be measured in time sequences, two and one-half weeks may be too
long a suppression of constitutionally protected film. In Freedman, the
Court held out as a model the New York injunctive procedure which pro-
vided for a judicial hearing one day after joinder and for a judicial decision
two days after the hearing. 71 In Trans-Lux Distributing Corp. v. Maryland
Board of Censors,72 the Maryland Supreme Court found an eight day admin-
istrative period within the bounds of Freedman. In Interstate Circuit, Inc. v.
such ... picture or series of pictures, or cause them to be inspected within two days of
receipt by the Film Review Section . . . and forthwith shall either grant or deny the
permit......
155-5. It shall be the duty of the Superintendent of Police to refuse to issue such permit
if the picture, considered as a whole, is obscene when viewed by children. The term
"children" means any person less than eighteen years of age ...
155-7.1. . . Within seven days after rejection by the Superintendent of Police, the
Motion Picture Appeal Board shall meet to review the decision of the Superintendent....
Within three days after the Board's meeting, the Board shall serve written notice of its
ruling upon the applicant. ....
155-7.2. In the event the Motion Picture Appeal Board affirms the decision of the Super-
intendent of Police in rejecting a motion picture, the Board, within three days from the
hearing, shall file with the Circuit Court of Cook County an action for an injunction
against the showing of the film. CHICAGO, ILL., MuNIcIPAL CODE, ch. 155 (1968).
71 See text between footnotes 50 and 52.
t2 Supra note 56.
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City of Dallas,73 the Federal Court of Appeals declared a nine day adminis-
trative procedure a sufficient compliance with the Freedman yardsticks. As
a practical matter, adequate administrative review of a motion picture can
readily take place in a matter of days, five at the most, under an efficient
censoring procedure. Ultimately, the failure to provide for a brief administra-
tive period coupled with the absence of a guarantee for a prompt judicial
order must render the new Chicago ordinance fatally defective, on the same
grounds Teitel Film found the prior ordinance constitutionally void.
To remedy this legislative quandary, the city can revise the new enact-
ment to afford a five day administrative time period but cannot, on its own,
assure the promptness of judicial proceedings. It must seek the cooperation
of the judiciary.7 4 Courts at both the trial and appellate levels must make it
a practice to manipulate their dockets giving priority to censorship cases.
In Trans-Lux Distributing Corp. v. Maryland Board of Censors,75 a statute
provided for the advancement of censorship cases on the court schedules. In
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas,76 the state courts voluntarily ad-
vanced such causes. Until the Illinois courts agree to advance censorship
cases, long periods of decisional delays will result, subjecting non-obscene
motion pictures to first amendment infringement.
Of final concern to this case note is a statutory proposal for practical
censorship legislation designed to replace the constitutionally abusive ad-
ministrative systems.7 7 Recommendations for prospective censorship enact-
7 8 Supra note 59.
74 In the past, the Illinois courts have not juggled their dockets to accommodate
censorship cases. Supra notes 1, 64 and 67.
75 Supra note 56.
7 6 Supra note 59.
77 Censorship of obscene motion pictures is constitutionally allowable and legislatively
accepted in a number of states and municipalities.
On a municipal level, the number of cities with censorship ordinances is uncertain.
Various surveys conclude with different results: a 1954 investigation discovered 60
communities with censorship regulation, a 1957 survey showed less than twenty
cities with similar legislation, and a third study concluded that fifty municipalities
licensed films. But all the investigations agreed that most cities reviewed films hap-
hazardly; only a handful of cities systematically enforce censorship ordinances on a
daily basis. IRA H. CARMEN, MOVIES, CENSORSHIP, AND THE LAW 184-86 (1966).
On a state level, four states currently provide by statute for movie censorship regula-
tion: Florida (FLA. STAT. § 521.01-03 (1955)), Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. § 4:301-4:307
(1950)), Maryland (MD. ANNvr. CODE art. 66A, § 1-26 (1965)), New York (N.Y. EDUC.
LAW § 120-32 (McKinney 1953)). For a detailed and thorough analysis of the operation
of such ordinances and statutes see IRA H. CARMEN, supra.
On the federal level, two statutes incorporate the prior restraint-censorship procedure:
18 U.S.C. § 1462 prohibits the importation of obscene material into the country and
18 U.S.C. § 1461 prevents obscene films from being shipped through interstate com-
merce or through the mails. Under both provisions, the determination of obscenity is
decided by an administrative screening procedure.
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ments are not wanting. Justice Brennan speaking for the Court in Jacobellis
v. Ohio7s remarked:
We recognize the legitimate and indeed exigent interest of states and localities
throughout the Nation in preventing the dissemination of material deemed harm-
ful to children. But that interest does not justify a total suppression of such
material, the effect of which would be to "reduce the adult population ... to
reading . . .what is fit for children. . . ." State and local authorities might well
consider whether their objectives in this area would be better served by laws aimed
specifically at preventing distribution of objectionable material to children, rather
than at totally prohibiting its dissemination. 79
In an earlier pronouncement, the Court acknowledged that "motion pictures
possess a greater capacity for evil, particularly among the youth of a com-
munity, than other modes of expression."8 0 Analogously, much censorship
legislation has been prompted by a community consensus that a cancerous
cause and effect relation exists between obscene films and youthful immoral-
ity."' Chicago's newly passed ordinance bears witness to such a conclusion.
These judicial and social expressions give rise to the thesis that movie
censorship is only practical when directed at youthful audiences.8 2
In addition to the legal restraints and prohibitions, many extra-legal organizations
and community groups attempt to regulate the dissemination of obscene material. See
generally, John Cornelius Levy, A Position on the Control of Obscenity, 51 Ky. L.J.
641, 647 (1962); and R. W. HANEY, COMSTOCKERY IN AERICA (1960).
78378 U.S. 184 (1964).
79Id. at 195.
8
oJoseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952). A state supreme court
justice best explicated the rationale of such a conclusion:
"In these times of alarming rise of juvenile delinquency and of increasing criminality in
this country, attributed by social agencies, at least in part, to the character of the
exhibitions put on in the show houses of the country, criminal prosecution after the fact
is a weak and ineffective remedy to meet the problem at hand." Superior Films, Inc. v.
Dept. of Educ., 159 Ohio St. 315, 328, 112 N.E.2d 311, 318 (1953).
81 Whether the community's recognition that obscene material induces immoral or
criminal behavior is a valid thesis remains statistically debatable. There exists no cor-
respondingly conclusive consensus among psychologists, sociologists, and other social
scientists and their investigations and studies. See generally MURPHY, CENSORSHI':
GOVERNMENT AND OBSCENITY 131-51 (1960); Giglio, Prior Restraint of Motion Pictures,
69 DICK. L. REV. 379 (1965); compare concurring opinion of Justice Douglas in A Book
Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of A Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 431-32 (1966), with the dissenting opinion of Justice Clark
in the same case at 452-53. While statistically and authoritatively there is debate, from an
educational viewpoint obscenity is harmful. Impressionable children and maturing adoles-
cents feed and grow on what they read and see. Should their literary and recreational diet
include perverse, immoral, and pornographic materials, these publications will necessarily
effect the thinking and actions of youths, which effect, if uncontrolled will lead to the
harmful consequences of perversiveness and immorality.
82 See generally, Comment, Exclusion of Children from Violent Movies, 67 CoLum.
L. R v. 1149 (1967); Note, "For Adults Only": The Constitutionality of Governmental
Film Censorship By Age Classification, 69 YALE L. J. 141 (1959).
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. Present legislation now exists on which a proposed censorship act can
be modeled. Such legislation is of two types: injunctive remedies guarantee-
ing prompt judicial hearings; and, classification schemes effectively protecting
non-objectionable material. Exemplificative of a practical injunctive process,
New York has enacted a statute which enables public officials to bring an in-junctive action to restrain the dissemination of objectionable publications; the
person enjoined is entitled to a trial on the issues one day after joinder and
to a judicial decision two days after the trial.83 Florida has adopted a
statute applying the New York scheme to motion picture restraint.84 The
statute provides for a state attorney to obtain an injunction against the
pending exhibition of an objectionable film; the person enjoined is allowed
a trial on the issue one day after joinder. Illustrative of the classification sys-
tem, the cities of Dallas and Chicago have passed limited procedures narrow-
ing the scope of censorship to films accessible to children under the age of
eighteen.8
5
The preceeding analysis coupled with the Freedman-Teitel Film safeguards
presents suggestions for the constitutional make up of prospective censorship
enactments. The proposed legislation should incorporate these drafting
guidelines.
On the municipal level, a practical ordinance would operate as a legis-
lative hybrid, containing elements of both the injunctive process and the
classification system. Under its provisions, a city attorney would be per-
mitted to bring an injunctive action against the pending exhibition of an
obscene film only if the exhibitor sought to show the movie to the general
public; the person enjoined would be entitled to a trial on the issue of
obscenity three days after joinder and to a judicial determination two days
after the trial. The implementation of such an ordinance would require the
cooperation of the judiciary to juggle their dockets to give priority to such
cases.
On the state level, a viable statute would act in a similar manner, again in-
corporating provisions of both the injunctive and classification procedures.
Under its provisions, a state attorney would be allowed to obtain an injunc-
tion against the pending exhibition of an obscene movie if the exhibitor
sought to show the movie to adults and children alike; the person enjoined
would be entitled to a trial on the issues one day after joinder and to a judi-
cial decision two days after the trial ended.86
83 See text between footnotes 36 and 37.
84 FLA. STAT. § 521.021 (1962). For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages
of the Florida injunctive remedy see IaA H. CARMEN, MoviEs, CFNsoasiup, AND THE LAW
244-48 (1966).
85 See text between footnotes 59, 62, 70 and 71.
36 The additional three days in the municipal scheme allows for a greater latitude of
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The above proposed censorship legislation would operate as a prior re-
straint within the bounds of the Freedman-Teitel Film guidelines. Such an
enactment would provide for the suppression of objectionable motion pic-
tures before their exhibition while affording non-objectionable films a high
degree of constitutional protection. While such a proposal does not obviate
all the pitfalls of a censorship system, it minimizes such hazards and strikes
a balance between the public's right to constitutional protection from the
abuses of liberties and the individual's freedom to express himself.8 7 Inherent
in any censorship system are dangers of the infringement of first amendment
guarantees, but that is the risk to be perceived by governmental bodies who
employ a prior restraint on the dissemination of objectionable materials.
Legislatures are not without avenues of approach to the social evil of toxic
publications and films. Post-publication penal statutes criminal in nature,88
classification systems, injunctive proceedings in rem or in personam, ad-
ministrative censorship, all present constitutional alternatives, some more
viable than others. But, in the implementation of any one or more of these
schemes, legislators and censors must not lose sight of the extra-constitutional
proposition that "law can discover sin, but not remove. ' 89
Roger Haydock
judicial cooperation, avoiding an unreasonable request by a city which, unlike a state,
is powerless to control court dockets. On both the state and local level, the proposed
enactment would incorporate the additional procedural safeguard outlined in Freedman
that the burden of proving the film obscene rests with the censor. Supra note 2, at 58.
87 The advantages of such an injunctive-classification scheme are many: Not every
exhibited film is subject to a previous restraint, only those motion pictures to be shown
to adults and children alike. Secondly, the adults' first amendment liberties are not
violated by the proposed scheme, only the children's freedom of viewing is curtailed, and
justifiably so in light of the harmful effects of obscene material. Thirdly, the bureaucratic
administrative process is eliminated in favor of a guaranteed prompt and efficient
judicial procedure. Lastly, an attorney, schooled in legal and social doctrines, rather than
a civil censor, usually insensitive to the community pulse, takes the first censorship step.
88 For a proposal for revised criminal statutes for the dissemination of objectionable
material to children and adults see, R. H. KUR, FOOLISH FIGLEAVES 249-268 and 290-316
(1967).
89 JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST XII, 1.290.
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